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“Should Bank Supervisors Disclose Information About Their
Banks?” Edward Simpson Prescott, Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond Economic Quarterly, Winter 2008, vol. 94, no. 1, 
pp. 1-16.
B
ank supervisors monitor banks for “safety and sound-
ness.” If investigations detect problems, supervisors
can act to reduce a bank’s risk, which protects taxpayer lia-
bility. The supervisors collect, on- and off- site, a wide body
of information, such as details on problem loans. They use
this information to rate banks, and results remain private
and confidential as required by regulatory policy.
Why not let banks voluntarily disclose or require super-
visors to share useful information that, incidentally, costs
about $3 billion (in 2005) to collect? So if banks could 
disclose their risk ratings, would better information lead to
more efficient market prices of bank securities and avoid
costly, duplicate collection efforts?
Richmond Fed economist Ned Prescott built a model 
to investigate whether there was a good reason to require
disclosure. He found that public disclosure of bank ratings
by supervisors can create an incentive for banks to withhold
information so they can get better ratings and gain market
favor. So, mandatory disclosure may hurt the ability of the
supervisor to collect that information in the first place. 
(In the model, allowing banks to make exam results public is
the same as requiring a supervisor to share the information.)
Prescott also shows that allowing a bank to voluntarily 
disclose its exam report is no better. If a bank did not 
disclose its report voluntarily, the markets would assume it
withheld the information because it had a bad rating since,
if it had a good rating, it would have disclosed the informa-
tion. As a result, voluntary disclosure can impair supervisors’
ability to gather information in the same way that 
mandatory disclosure can — by creating incentives for
banks to withhold it. His findings demonstrate that there
are good reasons for supervisors not to share some of this
information. 
“What Is the Optimal Inflation Rate?” Roberto M. Billi and
George A. Kahn. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Economic Review, Second Quarter 2008, pp. 5-27.
T
he Federal Reserve Act calls on Fed policymakers to
maintain price stability and maximum employment.
The optimal long-run inflation rate is the rate that best 
fulfills this dual mandate. Kansas City Fed economists
Roberto Billi and George Kahn argue in a new paper 
that for the Fed to carry out its mandate, its long-run 
inflation target cannot be zero percent per year. 
According to the authors, if the inflation rate is at zero
percent, an adverse shock could easily push the inflation rate
below zero. A negative inflation rate — known as deflation
— can be particularly harmful to an economy. A positive —
but low — inflation rate could serve as a buffer against any
adverse shocks that could push the inflation rate into defla-
tionary territory. 
The authors cite studies that show an upward bias of as
much as 1 percent in the Consumer Price Index annual infla-
tion rate and as much as 0.6 percent in that of the Personal
Consumption Expenditures (PCE) price index. As a result,
an annual inflation rate of zero percent as measured by these
indices would mean that the economy is undergoing a defla-
tion. Billi and Kahn note that when the inflation rate is very
close to zero, the federal funds rate is likely to be near zero
as well. Thus, the ability of the Fed to lower the federal funds
rate would be restricted. This could constrain the Fed’s abil-
ity to stimulate a slumping economy.
With these issues in mind, Billi and Kahn use a macro-
economic model of the U.S. economy to calculate the
optimal annual inflation rate. They find that the optimal
annual inflation rate is between 0.7 percent and 1.4 percent
when measured using the PCE price index. This estimate is
lower than previously published estimates that had specified
the optimal annual inflation rate to be about 2 percent.
“How Do EITC Recipients Spend Their Refunds?” Andrew
Goodman-Bacon and Leslie McGranahan. Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives, Second Quarter 2008,
pp. 17-32. 
F
irst introduced in 1975, the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) is one of the largest federal government assis-
tance programs targeted to lower-income households.
Designed to encourage work force participation, the pro-
gram distributed $40 billion to 22 million families in 2004. 
In a new study, Chicago Fed economist Leslie
McGranahan and former associate economist, Andrew
Goodman-Bacon, investigate the spending patterns of
EITC-eligible households during February and March, the
period in which EITC benefits are disbursed. The authors
found that these households increase relative average
monthly spending on vehicles in February by 35 percent rel-
ative to non-EITC families. The EITC families also spent
more on other transportation costs. “Given the crucial role
of access to transportation in promoting work, this leads to
the conclusion that recipient spending patterns support the
program’s prowork goals,” the authors conclude. RF
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